

Approved For Release 1996/05/28 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300070045-9

TCP 44-74

Trends in Communist Propaganda

31 Oct 74

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(Vol. XXV, No. 44)

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
TRENDS

In Communist Propaganda

Confidential

31 OCTOBER 1974
(VOL. XXV, NO. 44)

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U. S. - S O V I E T R E L A T I O N S

MOSCOW SEES KISSINGER VISIT CONFIRMING DETENTE COURSE

Secretary Kissinger's visit to Moscow from 23 to 27 October has been presented in the Soviet media as a "useful" but not particularly dramatic event, the main significance of which lies in the testimony it gives that U.S.-Soviet relations are still moving in the "right direction." This positive assessment has been conveyed less by what Moscow has said about the talks themselves--on which little information has been made public--than by surrounding comment on the general subject of U.S.-Soviet relations and by reports of the ceremonial speeches. Both the comment and the speeches have stressed the continuity of the present course in U.S.-Soviet relations, pointing up the linkage of the present meeting with past ones, as well as with the forthcoming meeting between Brezhnev and the President in Vladivostok.

The image of the United States and of the attitude of the U.S. Administration presented in this material has been uniformly favorable. On the eve of the talks, IZVESTIYA carried a dispatch from New York by correspondent V. Kobyshev which said that "detente" had become a commonly accepted word in the American idiom, reflecting broad acceptance of the concept by U.S. public opinion. At the conclusion of the visit, a Moscow Radio observers roundtable on 27 October stressed the linkage of the Kissinger visit with the visit of Secretary Simon the week before, as well as with other recent contacts between U.S. and Soviet officials. "All this is testimony," said commentator Matveyev, that U.S.-Soviet agreements are not just "paper pacts" but are being successfully implemented.

The commitment of the Ford Administration to continue the policies of its predecessor has been singled out for particular notice. Gromyko drew attention to it in his speech at the luncheon he gave for Secretary Kissinger on the first day of the talks. He noted that Brezhnev at the opening session had "expressed satisfaction" with President Ford's statements indicating his intention to continue "the course that has been adopted." A number of commentaries, including the Moscow Radio observers roundtable, also drew attention to the point.

The commitment of the Soviet leadership to the detente course has also been stressed, with no less emphasis on the personal nature of the commitment. The most striking expression of the commitment

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came in Gromyko's speech at the luncheon which Secretary Kissinger hosted at the U.S. Embassy on 26 October. Referring to the readiness of the Soviet Union to continue the search for solutions with the United States, Gromyko said that the genuineness of commitment was attested by Brezhnev's personal participation in the talks with Secretary Kissinger. This is a fact which speaks for itself, he said, "and quite eloquently at that." He went on to assert that "our party's Central Committee, the Soviet Government, and L. I. Brezhnev . . . personally" are fully resolved to pursue the course of improving U.S.-Soviet relations.

PEKING SEES INTENSIFIED ARMS RACE BEHIND MOSCOW TALKS

Peking reacted with unusual speed to Secretary Kissinger's Moscow visit and talks with Brezhnev, with separate NCNA reports on 25 and 27 October presenting the two sides' professions of detente as a cover for their intensified arms rivalry. Peking had portrayed Kissinger's last visit to Moscow last March at the head of a U.S. delegation in the same light, but on that occasion it had waited until the Secretary returned home before offering its assessment.

Consistent with its recent propaganda stress on the "reality" of a superpower arms race lurking behind the "smokescreen" of detente, Peking linked the sessions in Moscow with recent reported advances in U.S.-Soviet arms programs, offering its most comprehensive assessment in recent months of U.S.-Soviet arms development. Thus, the 25 October report cited Western press observations that recent Soviet "launchings of rocket carriers" in the Western Pacific were timed to coincide with Kissinger's arrival in order to "strengthen its posture for the forthcoming talks." It went on to note reports that Moscow had recently tested "improved" MIRV's, its "latest longrange rockets," had developed a "mobile launching system" for ICBMs, and had built "151 new silos for emplaced ICBM's"--developments which NCNA said "raises diplomatic and military problems for the United States" and could have "far-reaching effects on the nuclear balance" between the superpowers. NCNA on the 27th added the claim that Moscow had also recently developed "a new mobile antiballistic guided missiles system," which "many U.S. officials" regarded as an open violation of the 1972 agreement on ABM's.

Peking has portrayed the United States as equally determined to sustain its position against Soviet advances, with the NCNA report on the 27th giving special attention to the 25 October Pentagon announcement of a

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successful launching from an aircraft of a Minuteman ICBM. Citing the Western press, NCMA said that "Kissinger and the Department of Defense have consistently pushed this (airborne ICBM) test program in order to give the Soviet Union a deep impression that the United States is fully prepared to match them in developing mobile ICBM's," and that "U.S. leaders regard the new weapons system" "as an important bargaining chip in the strategic arms limitation talks."

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ARAB-ISRAELI ISSUE

MOSCOW WELCOMES ARAB SUMMIT DECISION ON PALESTINE QUESTION

Moscow typically has paid the usual lip service in welcoming the results of the seventh Arab summit conference, held in Rabat 26-29 October, as a demonstration of "anti-imperialist" Arab unity. While it has hailed the summit decision on the Palestine question, it has also typically failed to come to grips with the effect this decision will have on future Arab-Israeli negotiations for a Mideast settlement. The resolution on Palestine, adopted on the 28th, confirmed the claims of the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) as sole legitimate representative of all Palestinian Arabs and endorsed the PLO's right to establish an independent national authority on liberated Palestinian territory. The resolution raises questions about Jordanian and PLO representation in any negotiations and even about the fate of future talks given Israel's refusal to negotiate with the PLO. Moscow has depicted the Israeli reaction as one of anger and disappointment, citing Tel Aviv's refusal to sit at the negotiating table with the PLO, but drawing no conclusions as to how this might affect efforts for a settlement.

Nor has Moscow addressed itself to the question of possible establishment of a Palestinian government in exile now that the summit supported the establishment of an "independent Palestinian authority." Moscow reported, almost in passing, that Egyptian President as-Sadat said a Palestinian government in exile would be formed soon, but has taken no note of speculation in Arab media on this subject. And scarcely a month before the summit conference, an article in the October issue of INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS had reiterated previous Soviet criticism of Palestinian disarray and again advised the Palestinians to draw up a "sober, democratic program" aimed at a just Mideast settlement.

GENEVA TALKS Soviet comment pegged to the summit has blandly continued to call for resumption of the Geneva talks, appearing to brush off the practical implications of the Palestine resolution for the course of future negotiations. TASS on the 28th put the PLO-Jordanian dispute in the context of the Geneva conference, remarking that the Palestinian question had become the focal point of the summit due to opposing PLO and Jordanian views on "representation" of the Palestinians, particularly those in the West Bank. The issue at stake, TASS

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said, was "most closely connected with the representation of both sides" at Geneva. Subsequent treatment of the Geneva representation issue suggests that Moscow may share the general uncertainty over conflicting reports of possible Jordanian and/or PLO representation at the conference. Thus a Moscow radio commentary broadcast in English to Africa on the 29th asserted that the summit had agreed that "the PLO will send its representatives to the next session of the Geneva conference on the Middle East as members of the Jordanian delegation." But TASS on the 30th, reporting Moroccan King Hassan's press conference that day, cited him as saying that the decision on "Arab countries' participation" in the Geneva talks rested with the "states immediately confronting the Israeli aggression."

While TASS accounts of President Ford's 29 October press conference made no mention of his remark about the need for movement toward settlement of Israeli-Egyptian problems, Israeli-Syrian problems, and problems "between Israel and Jordan or the PLO," Moscow broadcasts in Arabic on the 30th misrepresented his comment. Thus a Timoshkin commentary, in the course of extolling the "very great success" of the Rabat conference, cited the President as "calling on Israel not to obstruct the participation of the legitimate representatives of the Palestinian people" in the work of the Geneva conference. And a brief news item claimed that the President had stated that the "Israeli Government should change its stand toward the PLO and not hinder the participation of its representatives in the Geneva peace conference."

Moscow has occasionally linked its comment on Arab political unity with warnings against following the negotiating approach advocated by the United States. IZVESTIYA political observer V. Matveyev, for instance, speaking on the Moscow radio observers' roundtable on 27 October, praised the results of united Arab action in the past but warned that Arab states "have not always managed to achieve this unity," due in large part to Western attempts to foster Arab differences. Matveyev charged that these attempts presently included convincing certain Arab governments they should arrange for "separate agreements of a limited character--thus by-passing the Geneva conference." A 31 October PRAVDA article by B. Kotov, reported by TASS, interpreted the Rabat conference as a rejection by the Arab states of "plans for 'partial,' 'stage-by-stage,' or 'separate' solutions in the Middle East." At the same time, Kotov noted that the United States and the USSR, as guarantors of the UN Security Council resolutions, would have to be consulted by those Arab governments that reaffirmed their readiness at Rabat to participate in the Geneva conference, "after they coordinate their views with the PLO as well as with the two great powers."

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CSCE-MBFR

MOSCOW'S DEADLINE FOR CSCE IMPLIED AT WARSAW CP CONCLAVE

Moscow has seemingly indicated a desire to bring the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) to a conclusion before mid-1975. The final communique of the 16-18 October Warsaw "consultative" meeting of 28 European communist parties stated that the participants decided to prepare to hold a conference of European communist parties in East Berlin "no later than mid-1975."* In speeches at the Warsaw meeting, CPSU Politburo member and secretary Ponomarev and many of the East European spokesmen declared that the East Berlin mid-year conference should follow the successful conclusion of the CSCE. Moscow would appear to be signaling its hope for a conclusion to CSCE at the latest by next spring, possibly with the idea of marking the 30th anniversary of the end of World War II by holding the CP conference in East Berlin.

Ponomarev, according to the 18 October PRAVDA account of his speech, told the Warsaw meeting on the 16th "it is to be assumed" the CSCE would end with positive results which can be viewed as a great success. "Our delegation," he added, "proceeds from the assumption that the communist conference would be held after the end of the all-European conference of states." Polish CP Politburo member Babiuch was slightly more specific in his speech on the 17th, saying "we hope" that the CSCE will be "concluded early next year."

The call for a CSCE conclusion this year has all but disappeared from even routine Soviet comment on CSCE; more authoritative comment and official statements continue to call for an end of the conference "as soon as possible," "in the nearest future," "soon," or use similar vague formulations. For example, Brezhnev, in his speech at the 28 October Kremlin dinner for visiting FRG Chancellor Schmidt, called for "speediest conclusion" of the conference while again arguing in effect that CSCE negotiators should only attempt to resolve those questions now ripe for solution and not those which lie "beyond the limits of reality."

* For an analysis of the Warsaw "consultative" meeting, see the TRENDS of 23 October 1974, pages 8-11.

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ELEMENTS OF OPTIMISM APPEAR IN COMMENT ON 1ST MBFR ANNIVERSARY

Scattered elements of new optimism have appeared in Soviet and East European comment on the Vienna negotiations on force reductions since they resumed on 24 September and with the passing of the first anniversary of these negotiations on 30 October. The thrust of much comment continues to stress the differences and incompatibility of the two sides' draft proposals, although previous appeals for a first "symbolic" step to get the talks moving and to increase mutual trust have reappeared with some frequency of late. At least two East European press articles have offered one new element, implying that there is a certain commonality in the approach of the two sides, while the idea that compromise is needed on both sides also has been introduced. Moscow has again apparently resorted to a press leak in Vienna to convey the impression the MBFR talks are not totally stalemated, in order to counter pessimism voiced in the Western press.

A call for compromises and mutual concessions came in a signed article in the 24 September Polish daily GLOS PRACY, which argued that now it is necessary "to search for compromise solutions" and that it is not unusual that "final success" at international conferences "depends on mutual concessions." The notion of common elements in the two sides' proposals appeared in an article in the Polish weekly POLITYKA of 28 September by Warsaw's main commentator on MBFR, A. Rayzacher. He pointed out that despite all the substantial differences, "propositions from both sides have a common methodological point"--there is talk about the first step in reduction which could be used both for building confidence and to accumulate empirical experience for making further reductions. A similar assertion was made in a Sandor Pirityi article in the Budapest weekly MAGYARORSZAG of 6 October.

RAYZACHER ARTICLE Rayzacher in his article sounded a note of optimism in recalling that both Pact and NATO spokesmen had previously made statements to the effect that "the first understandings can be expected at the turn of 1974 and 1975, and the implementation of the first step in the coming year." Rayzacher was optimistic with regard to progress at Vienna. Alluding to Brezhnev's "tasting of the wine" speech in May 1971, in which he called on NATO to start negotiations on force reductions to see what the Pact had to offer, Rayzacher asked rhetorically whether the "Viennese bottle" was half full or half empty. Noting statements by spokesmen for the two sides, he concluded that "the optimists are therefore surely right."

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In a rare departure for an East European or Soviet commentator, Rayzacher also indirectly broached one of the fundamental issues dividing the two sides in Vienna--the Warsaw Pact demand that any negotiated ceiling on force levels must apply to the national armed forces of the individual states instead of alliance-wide force levels. In a nonpolemical tone, Rayzacher sought to counter West European arguments that the Pact sought international control and limitations on the entire structure of the West European armed forces and the sovereignty of the West European states to manage their defenses on their own national territory, or to prevent the political integration of West Europe and its military autonomy within NATO. While noting Pact disapproval of such moves toward West European integration, Rayzacher seemed to hint there was room for compromise on this issue, observing that the East Europeans "also recognize the objective character of the processes of integration in the capitalist part of Europe."

GLOS PRACY's call for mutual concessions and Rayzacher's restrained approach to a sensitive issue have not been echoed in Soviet comment, but they are of more than routine interest since East European commentators in the past have seldom ventured far beyond the positions of their Soviet counterparts on MBFR.

SOVIET STATEMENTS Moscow's recent authoritative comment has included a mixture of positive statements on the MBFR talks and critical assessments of the NATO bargaining position. The PRAVDA editorial article on 13 October--marking the 10th anniversary of Khrushchev's ouster--included an almost verbatim reiteration of one of Brezhnev's most optimistic statements on MBFR, first made in his 14 June Supreme Soviet election speech in Moscow. PRAVDA observed: "The USSR is ready initially to agree even to partial measures. The Soviet side sees a possibility in the near future of achieving specific results at the talks on the reduction of armed forces and armaments in Central Europe if, of course, good will is displayed by all participants." Brezhnev's more recent remarks--at a 28 October Kremlin dinner for FRG Chancellor Schmidt--were in the critical tone more common to Soviet leadership statements on this issue: He pointed out that "considerable differences in the principles of the sides . . . are manifested at the talks" and charged that "some participants in the talks manifest the striving to obtain unilateral advantages." (Soviet comment routinely implies that the NATO powers do not have a joint proposal at the Vienna MBFR talks.) Brezhnev concluded by lecturing his West German visitors: "If there is a wish to reach an agreement, it would be better to give up such strivings. It can hardly be regarded as realistic to seek to build one's security to the detriment of the security of others."

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PRESS LEAK ON PACT PROPOSAL The most recent Vienna press leak on MBFR developments, obviously based on Warsaw Pact sources, came in an Austrian Press Agency (APA) report published in the Viennese press on the 25th and picked up by TASS five days later.* The APA report cited "informed quarters in Vienna that the Warsaw Pact states have submitted a new compromise proposal." The report noted that the new proposal would make it possible for force reductions "to begin before the end of 1975" and added that the Pact was "convinced that this new initiative opens a genuine opportunity for concrete progress." The timing of the rumor, coinciding with Secretary Kissinger's visit to Moscow, seemed designed to suggest that Washington and Moscow might be able to move the talks off dead center--a tactic Moscow has used before at times of high-level U.S.-Soviet talks. The announcement on Kissinger's 23-27 October visit to Moscow said that the two sides "also feel that progress is possible" in the Vienna talks.

Moscow acknowledged the rumor of a compromise proposal in an unsigned TASS dispatch from Vienna on 30 October which took note of Western press articles "about a 'breakthrough' in the talks." Without mentioning the source of the reports, TASS went on to say that the Vienna press articles reported that the "initiative comes from 'the Warsaw treaty countries.'" TASS also cited the press articles' discussion of the possibility of "concrete progress already during 1975" in the context of the Pact's proposals to implement "initial cutbacks in 1975 which would mark a practical step towards reaching the general goal of the talks."

* See the TRENDS of 27 March 1974, pages 8-9, for a discussion of previous Soviet comment on "press leaks" on MBFR.

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COMMUNIST RELATIONS

PRAVDA ARTICLE HAILS RESULTS OF WARSAW CONSULTATIVE MEETING

Moscow waited 12 days after the windup of the 16-18 October Warsaw "consultative" meeting of European communist parties before issuing its first authoritative comment--a 30 October PRAVDA editorial article which praised the gathering as a contribution to European security and communist unity and predicted that the European CP conference planned next year would be "a major international event." Like the communique issued at the close of the Warsaw meeting, the PRAVDA editorial article did not mention a world communist conference, thus apparently confirming the Soviet bloc's inclination to put that project aside for the time being while concentrating on the sizable task of preparing the European conference. Moscow's orthodox East European allies have likewise avoided the subject of a world conference both at Warsaw and in followup comment, whereas earlier the East Europeans had clearly linked a European party meeting to a subsequent world party conference. Moscow itself has not called for a new world party conference since the idea was broached in November 1973.

The PRAVDA article generally follows the main lines of Soviet delegate Ponomarev's speech to the Warsaw meeting, a speech keyed to the theme of unity in diversity. Like Ponomarev, the article asserts that the planned European CP conference must hammer out a "common" line based on a free exchange of views. The conference documents must, PRAVDA said, express "the coordinated opinion of all the parties attending" as well as "the right of each party to take the floor at the conference and raise any problems that it may deem necessary."

While this approach seems calculated to reassure the more independent members of the movement--Romania, Yugoslavia, and the Italian CP--that their views will be heard at the conference, it also clearly provides a formula that would leave an opening for raising the controversial China issue at the conference. However, the three independents have consistently served notice, both before and at the Warsaw meeting, that their participation in the 1975 European CP conference and its preparations was contingent on scrupulous avoidance of any criticism of "absent" parties during the proceedings. There was apparently no direct mention of the China issue in speeches during the Warsaw meeting.

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While the PRAVDA editorial article did not mention the Chinese directly, other Soviet comment in the wake of the Warsaw meeting was less restrained. Thus, a Sibiriyakov commentary broadcast by Moscow radio on the 24th charged that "imperialist propaganda" prior to the Warsaw gathering had "tried to persuade everybody that the meeting was intended to keep out China," adding that "all kinds of renegades, opportunists, and Maoists" had adopted the same viewpoint. The absence of any mention of the Warsaw meeting by Peking media was denounced in a Mulin commentary broadcast in Mandarin on the 28th: The talk voiced a belief that "the Chinese communists would have been interested in the Warsaw meeting had they known about its aim" of promoting detente, but "the Maoist leaders would not even let them know" about the gathering.

NEPSZABADZAG
COMMENT

In contrast to the conciliatory tone of the PRAVDA editorial, the Hungarian party daily NEPSZABADSAG on 20 October issued a stern prediction that next year's European CP conference would reflect the views of Moscow and its orthodox allies, whether the independent participants like it or not. Thus, the article, by Berecz, head of the MSZMP Central Committee's foreign department, noted that "one party or another sometimes overemphasized the significance of the principle of unanimity"--a principle which the article said was desirable but should not be made into "a dogma." The principle of unanimity or consensus, it declared, must not "hamper the voluntarily assumed joint action . . . of the decisive majority of the sister parties." The outspoken Hungarians reiterated this point in a Vajda article in MAGYAR HIRLAP on the 23d, which similarly stressed that the communist parties "rule out considering the principle of unanimity as absolute." The article also raised the prospect of a conference final document not wholly acceptable to the independents, in noting that the participating parties can "decide for themselves whether they accept the jointly elaborated proposals and documents."

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VIETNAM

DRV PARTY JOURNAL ATTACKS "HOSTILE" ELEMENTS OPPOSING REGIME

A highly unusual editorial in the September issue of the Vietnam Workers Party (VWP) theoretical journal HOC TAP presents a striking picture of political and social disruption in North Vietnam and suggests strong party contention over policies. The editorial's content and tone go far beyond any earlier propaganda on postwar problems, even warning of the existence of "hostile tendencies and thoughts" opposed to basic party policies, including opposition to such aims as completing the revolution in South Vietnam.

HOC TAP editorials are often used to explain and reinforce new party lines, but the fact that thus far there has been no endorsement of the current editorial in other media suggests that it reflects the viewpoint of a discontented, militant faction within the leadership. The very appearance of an editorial in the party journal which departs so sharply from the usual propaganda line suggests that there may be a serious confrontation within the North Vietnamese party, with significant forces pressing for policy changes. The editorial's militant position on the war in South Vietnam and its criticism of "opportunist" elements in the North could be read, not only as an indictment of laxity, indifference, and softness among the Vietnamese population in general, but also as an attack on present party policies and their sponsors.

POLICIES TOWARD
SOUTH VIETNAM

The editorial's discussion of the "party line" on South Vietnam is more militant than the usual Hanoi statements, suggesting that its author may not merely be defending an agreed position but, in fact, be advocating more aggressive action. Seeming to attack elements which would be reticent to endorse military action to take over South Vietnam, the editorial caustically assails opportunists who prefer a "selfish, individualistic life" to "national independence and freedom." And, in an argument at odds with propaganda in the wake of the January 1973 Paris agreement calling for a political solution in the South, it decries those who would deny the "necessity to resort to revolutionary violence and revolutionary warfare to liberate the nation." Although the editorial begins by surveying the situation in the past year and a half, it makes no mention of the peace agreement itself.

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The editorial goes beyond the usual North Vietnamese line both in the precedence it gives to the struggle in the South, as opposed to construction in the North, and in its evaluation of the military balance of forces. In describing the nation's two "strategic tasks," the editorial first lists the "national democratic revolution in the South" and then the task of building socialism in the North--a reversal of the order of priorities established at the VWP's 3d party congress in September 1960 and reaffirmed in the description of tasks contained in the party Central Committee's 22d plenum resolution early this year. The editorial's appraisal of the balance of forces in Vietnam is less cautious than the usual communist claim--voiced, for example by Premier Pham Van Dong in his national day speech published in the same issue of HOC TAP--that the balance of forces is moving "more and more" in favor of the revolution. By contrast, the editorial claims a decisive edge, with "our people's revolutionary forces throughout the country...certainly stronger than the forces of the counterrevolutionary henchmen of the U.S. imperialists."

The editorial's claim of military superiority is unusual, but it has been made in the past by some representatives of the DRV military. Thus, DRV Defense Minister Vo Nguyen Giap similarly claimed in a 7 May speech that the forces of the revolution were "much stronger" than Saigon's "as far as the entire country is concerned." The military commentator "Chien Thang" (Victor) strongly advocated this view in articles in August 1973 which may have been intended to supply justification for increased communist attacks in the following months. The usual DRV appraisal of the balance of forces states that it is moving in favor of the communists, without claiming they have achieved superiority.

SOCIALIST REFORM IN NORTH VIETNAM

In the area of domestic policies, the HOC TAP editorial comes down hard on those who allegedly oppose socialist reform and "compulsory and dictatorial" measures to protect socialist property, stop illegal transactions, and maintain public order and security. Concern with the prevalence of such "negative phenomena" in North Vietnam is nothing new; however, the editorial goes beyond other Hanoi propaganda in portraying a sinister opposition to measures of reform.

Similar problems were addressed, for example, by Vice Premier Tran Huu Duc in an article in the March HOC TAP which complained at length about illegal activities, even involving state employees,

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and demanded "very firm and urgent measures" to check them. Duc also anticipated the current editorial's concern that some cadres did not show proper zeal in combatting such manifestations. However, Duc merely accused these cadres of misunderstanding the content of the struggle and misjudging the "serious impact" of illegal economic activities, while the editorial, by contrast, appears to be attacking willful opponents of reform policies. It repeatedly scores unnamed persons who allegedly have used the "pretext of respecting 'democracy' and 'freedom' in order to oppose the state's close control and managerial measures against those who have stolen socialist property and transacted illegal business, and against speculators and conspirators...."

The harsh tone of the editorial strikes a markedly different chord than the seemingly pragmatic line that has prevailed in North Vietnam in recent years. In particular, it seems at odds with the views of VWP First Secretary Le Duan expounded in his major February 1970 article and touched upon again in a March 1973 article on cadre problems. Le Duan stressed that the "essential nature" of the proletarian dictatorship was not "violence or oppression" but rather construction and organization, and he warned against preoccupation with the suppression of opponents of the proletariat. In his 1973 article he also maintained that with a correct political line there is only a minor risk of cadre deviations and "bad tendencies" can be "easily eliminated."

The HOC TAP editorial states that "a number" of cadres and party members are among those "entertaining an incorrect outlook" and that these views have been publicly disseminated. Thus, it warns that their incorrect outlook has encouraged hostile tendencies to develop into a "current of evil thoughts" which is being "conveyed from mouth to mouth" and has "appeared even in the press and in the literature and arts." Elsewhere it specifies that those who are "ideologically opposed" to the regime "have publicly propagated their hostile thoughts for sinister purposes." Hanoi media during the war occasionally complained of decadent, counterrevolutionary views being clandestinely disseminated, particularly among urban youths; however, the current editorial seems to be deploring a more serious situation in which authoritative organs have been used to propagandize an "evil" or "poisonous" line.

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The editorial calls for a "mass movement to struggle against negative phenomena" to be carried out along with the emulation movement for labor productivity which has been the key campaign in all areas of North Vietnamese society during the past year. It recommends that those who have erroneous points of view should be educated, but harshly demands punishment for elements "who are really opposed to our regime."

ACKNOWLEDGMENT OF
"FAMINE" IN NORTH

In another example of unusual candor, the editorial, listing DRV achievements, claims that North Vietnam was successful in "overcoming the famine which occurred in the preharvest period early this year as the result of natural calamities." At no time in recent years have Hanoi media been known to acknowledge the existence of "famine." Propaganda earlier this year did, however, take note of the delay in harvesting the fifth-month and spring rice crops. And a 19 June NHAN DAN editorial, for example, discussed the problems of state distribution of grain "in times of difficulty" and assistance to the peasants "in the recent period between the two crops."

DRV-PRC AGREEMENT ON ECONOMIC, MILITARY AID SIGNED IN PEKING

An agreement on Chinese economic and military aid to North Vietnam in 1975 was signed in Peking on 26 October by PRC Vice Premier Li Hsien-nien and DRV Vice Premier Le Thanh Nghi, capping negotiations that apparently began more than two months ago. Chinese aid for 1975 had been discussed, according to Hanoi media, during a Nghi visit to Peking in the first week of August. The usual DRV aid negotiator, Vice Foreign Trade Minister Ly Ban, has apparently been in Peking since that time.* In addition to the annual aid agreement, DRV and PRC foreign trade and military officials on the 26th signed a trade agreement and protocols on the supply of military equipment and materials and civilian goods. The last annual PRC-DRV aid agreement was signed in June 1973, during a visit to Peking by Vietnam Workers Party First Secretary Le Duan and Premier Pham Van Dong, and comparable protocols and a trade agreement were concluded in October 1973.

* Ly Ban is not known to have returned to North Vietnam following Le Thanh Nghi's 1-8 August visit to China, and he appeared at celebrations in Peking marking the 2 September DRV National Day anniversary. The DRV delegation's August visit is discussed in the TRENDS of 14 August 1974, pages 18-19. Last year's aid agreement is discussed in the TRENDS of 13 June 1973, pages 3-4.

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Hanoi media, as usual, specified that the annual agreement provided for "nonrefundable" aid and reported that Li Hsien-nien, at his banquet for the delegation, also referred to nonrefundable aid for 1975. Peking media had similarly characterized the aid agreements for the past two years, but this year returned to the previous PRC practice of omitting any description of the annual aid agreement even ignoring Li Hsien-nien's reported remark. Peking did report, however, that the military protocols provided for "gratuitous" supply of material.

Although a cryptic statement by Le Thanh Nghi at the 26 October banquet suggested that Chinese aid may have increased, Peking reports on the banquet appeared to reflect a deliberate Chinese policy of avoiding attention to Chinese assistance for Vietnam. The NCNA account of the banquet speeches by Li Hsien-nien and Le Thanh Nghi left out several references to Chinese backing for Vietnam which were included in Hanoi reports. Thus, NCNA's summary of Li Hsien-nien's speech, in addition to dropping his mention of the agreement on "nonrefundable economic and military aid," omitted his references to the two nations' talks on economic cooperation proceeding "on the basis of proletarian internationalism" and to their longstanding mutual "support and aid." NCNA retained no specific reference to assistance, only quoting Li as promising continuing "support" for Vietnam's "just struggle and socialist construction." The NCNA account also predictably omitted the statement by Nghi suggesting that Chinese aid had been stepped up: According to Hanoi radio, Nghi cited the current situation in Vietnam and the "schemes" of the United States and Thieu and asserted that in the face of such a situation, "an increase" in Chinese "support and assistance" is of "great significance and effect." In addition, NCNA left out a lengthy passage praising Sino-Vietnamese friendship, "on the basis of Marxism-Leninism and proletarian internationalism," and Nghi's assertion that the Chinese people consider "support and assistance" to Vietnam to be an "international obligation."

NCNA did report that Li Hsien-nien had recalled the PRG and DRV government statements of 8 and 11 October, respectively, and offered the "resolute support" of the "Chinese people" for them. Li's cautious endorsement, failing to mention the two statements' criticism of the United States and demand for Thieu's ouster, was not included in Hanoi's account of his remarks. Chinese backing for the statements had been offered earlier in a 15 October PEOPLE'S DAILY Commentator article.*

* The commentator article is discussed in the TRENDS of 17 October 1974, page 10.

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During Le Thanh Nghi's 25-28 stay in Peking, in addition to holding talks with Li Hsien-nien, he met with Chou En-lai in the hospital for a "cordial and friendly conversation" and had separate meetings with Prince Sihanouk and RGNU Prime Minister Penn Nouth. Le Thanh Nghi returned to Hanoi on the 28th, and there has been no indication whether he will visit other countries to sign annual aid agreements, as he has in past years. Other aid agreements for 1975 that are known to have been concluded by Hanoi are a pact with Albania, signed in the DRV with an Albanian delegation on 7 October, and an agreement with Bulgaria, signed in Sofia on 14 September by the head of the DRV delegation to Bulgarian National Day celebrations.*

* The Bulgarian- DRV aid agreement is discussed in the TRENDS of 18 September 1974, page 19.

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K O R E A

PEKING MARKS CPV ANNIVERSARY, STRESSES U.S. TROOP REMOVAL

Chinese comment pegged to the 24th anniversary of the entry of Chinese People's Volunteers (CPV) into the Korean War reflects both increasing Chinese attention to continued U.S. military involvement in South Korea as well as Peking's efforts to deemphasize its past military ties with Pyongyang. The anniversary was marked by the usual banquets in the two capitals and by traditional wreathlaying ceremonies in North Korea in honor of CPV dead, including one at the grave of Mao Tse-tung's son. As in previous years, the anniversary failed to trigger any editorial comment in the Chinese press, but drew the customary NODONG SINMUN editorial.

Chinese banquet speeches this year were harsher than those at last year's anniversary functions on the issue of withdrawal of U.S. troops from South Korea, containing the firmest language thus far in Peking's gradually hardening line on the presence of U.S. troops in Korea.* Politburo member Chen Hsi-lien, speaking at the Peking banquet, argued that there was still no solution on Korean reunification because South Korea was "still under the occupation of U.S. troops flaunting the UN flag." It was under the "aegis" of the United States, Chen asserted, that the Pak government was disrupting the North-South dialogue and suppressing the South Korean people. Chen demanded that the United States "immediately" stop interfering in Korea's internal affairs and specifically called for "U.S. troops flying the UN flag" to "pull out of South Korea without delay."

Speaking at the Pyongyang banquet on 25 October, Chinese ambassador Li Yun-chuan portrayed U.S. troops as a "grave obstacle" to Korean reunification and demanded that the "U.S. imperialist aggressor troops must be completely withdrawn from South Korea." The Chinese speaker at the Peking banquet last year, Ni Chih-fu, had not pointed to the United States in mentioning "outside interference" in Korea, nor had he mentioned any time frame on U.S. troop withdrawal. And Li, speaking last year in Pyongyang, merely

* For discussions of Chinese comment on U.S. troops in South Korea on recent anniversaries, see the TRENDS of 26 June 1974, pages 19-20; 10 July 1974, pages 8-9; and 17 July 1974, pages 16-17.

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called for the removal of U.S. troops from South Korea, characterizing them neither as imperialist aggressors nor as a stumbling block to Korean reunification.

NCNA's report on Chen's speech did not characterize the atmospherics at the banquet and failed to report any banquet toasts. Last year's report on the Peking banquet had described it as "permeated with an atmosphere of militant friendship and unity" and had reported toasts to the "blood-sealed great friendship" between Peking and Pyongyang. This year Ambassador Li noted that the Chinese treasure their "great friendship and unity" with the Koreans, but did not repeat the claim he made in 1973 that Pyongyang's "victory" in the Korean War had safeguarded China's security.

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BHUTTO VISIT TO MOSCOW

SOVIET PROPAGANDA WELCOMES CHANGES IN PAKISTANI POLICIES

Soviet propaganda accompanying Pakistani Prime Minister Zulfikar Ali Bhutto's 24-26 October visit to Moscow reflected the improvement in Soviet-Pakistani relations since Bhutto's last official visit to Moscow in March 1972.* Prior to Bhutto's arrival, TASS and Moscow radio broadcasts to South Asia carried a 23 October PRAVDA article favorably reviewing the "internal democratisation" in Pakistan since Bhutto's accession to power, and linked internal Pakistani developments to the "positive realistic tendencies" in Bhutto's foreign policy. The article particularly cited Pakistan's withdrawal from SEATO, establishment of diplomatic relations with the GDR, DRV, and DPRK, and "constructive contribution" to the "normalization" of the situation on the South Asian subcontinent. Soviet comment prior to Bhutto's 1972 trip had focused on the "serious crisis inherited by the country" from the recently deposed Yahya Khan regime, and the need for Bhutto to implement his announced program of socioeconomic reforms.

The agenda of Bhutto's visit and Soviet media characterization of the tone of Soviet-Pakistani consultations closely resembled those in 1972. Kosygin and Bhutto held two days of talks marked by an "identity or similarity of views," and party Secretary Brezhnev and Bhutto held a "friendly" meeting on 25 October in which "topical problems" were discussed. Kosygin's remarks at a 24 October dinner, reported in full in the 25 October PRAVDA, were general and optimistic in nature, expressing the hope that South Asia would be turned into an "area of durable peace," a seeming reference to Moscow's proposal for an Asian collective security system that Pakistan has consistently refused to endorse. Bhutto's remarks at the dinner, excerpted in PRAVDA, countered with a reference to Pakistan's proposal that South Asia be declared a "nuclear-free zone." A Moscow radio commentary, broadcast to South Asia on the 24th, went further than Kosygin when it explicitly stressed the need for an Asian collective security system and quoted Brezhnev's Kishinev speech on Soviet determination to work for peace in Asia.

Soviet reports of the 25 October Bhutto-Brezhnev meeting said nothing about the Asian collective security issue, but TASS quoted Brezhnev as reiterating Kosygin's earlier formulation that South

* Bhutto's 1972 Moscow visit is discussed in the TRENDS of 22 March 1972, pages 36-38.

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Asia should be turned into an "area of durable peace." The joint communique issued prior to Bhutto's departure on the 26th utilized the same formulation as in the 1972 communique, with both sides agreeing that "world peace and security in Asia" were dependent on scrupulous observation of the "principles of the UN charter."

On other issues the communique noted that an "identity or proximity" of positions was reached between the two sides, and Moscow agreed to begin negotiating a new trade agreement with the Pakistanis. (According to Karachi Domestic Service, the agreement will involve an additional 228 million ruble credit for the accelerated completion of the Soviet-built Karachi steel mill.) Bhutto "renewed" his invitation to Brezhnev, Podgornyy, and Kosygin to visit Pakistan, an offer which first appeared in the 1972 communique.

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U S S R

CONSERVATIVE NAMED NEW CHIEF EDITOR OF NOVY MIR

A conservative has now been appointed as chief editor of the prestigious literary journal NOVY MIR, long the rallying point for Soviet liberals and the target of relentless attacks by the ideological hardliners. TASS on 29 October revealed that 55-year old Sergey Narovchatov, chief of the Moscow branch of the writers union, has been named to the post most recently held by 64-year old liberal Valeriy Kosolapov. Kosolapov had become chief editor in early 1970, when outspoken liberal Aleksandr Tvardovskiy was forced out. Although Kosolapov ran the journal much more cautiously than his predecessor, he appears to have fallen into disfavor late this summer; in September he was demoted from chief editor to ordinary member of the editorial board.

Rumors of Narovchatov's impending appointment were reported in the 15 October FRANKFURTER ALLGEMEINE, and the 29 October TASS account referred to him as the "newly appointed" chief editor. The September issue of NOVY MIR, which was signed to press on 11 September, listed the deputy chief editor and responsible secretary but no chief editor, carrying Kosolapov's name only as a member of the board. The August issue, signed to press 5 August, had identified Kosolapov as chief editor. No other board members were affected as of September.

Although there has been no recent public criticism of NOVY MIR which would account for the change, the FRANKFURTER ALLGEMEINE account claimed that the July issue of the journal had originally been slated to carry a war novel on the Crimean Tartars, whom Stalin had deported during the war and whose fate has remained a sensitive issue for the regime since. A similar lapse in political caution had apparently caused Kosolapov's earlier ouster from the LITERARY GAZETTE chief editorship in the December 1962 crackdown. Reports at the time indicated that he was being punished for having published Yevtushenko's controversial poem "Babi Yar" and for refusing to print an article attacking abstract art.

Whereas Kosolapov's replacement of Tvardovskiy in 1970 represented no basic shift in the liberal orientation of NOVY MIR, the present change replaces a liberal with a writers union apparatchik who is known as an assailant of dissenters. Narovchatov has risen quickly

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in the conservative writers union hierarchy, having been elected a secretary of the Moscow branch in January 1965, of the RSFSR union in March 1970 and of the USSR union in November 1970, and having succeeded literary hatchetman Sergey Mikhalkov as Moscow first secretary in May 1970. Although not as strident as Mikhalkov, Narovchatov has repeatedly criticized dissenting and erring writers. Most recently, at a 27 February 1974 Moscow writers plenum reported in the 8 March LITERARY RUSSIA, he assailed poet Yevgeniy Yevtushenko for defending Solzhenitsyn and called on him to finally grow up and act his age. Narovchatov, himself a poet, has long shown a special animus against Yevtushenko. Among other indications, he bitterly assailed him at the March 1965 RSFSR Writers Union congress.

FURTSEVA DEATH AMIDST SCANDALS CLOSES STORMY CAREER

Radio Moscow on 25 October announced the death of Culture Minister Yekaterina Furtseva, of a heart attack at age 63. Furtseva's death came at a low point in her career, in which scandals affecting both her personal reputation and the performance of her ministry had raised the question of her removal; her death conveniently solves this question for the leadership. Her recent troubles recall an earlier phase in her stormy career when, after the 22d CPSU Congress, she was dropped from the Presidium and disappeared for several weeks amidst rumors of severe illness and attempted suicide.

Furtseva's recent troubles began last spring, when it was revealed that she had misused her position to build herself an expensive dacha. In May stories reached Western reporters that she had been rebuked and would not be reelected to the Supreme Soviet because of the scandal. The New York TIMES followed up this initial 25 May account with a 13 June report that she had not been assigned a Supreme Soviet election district when registration closed on 12 May, but that she had appealed to Brezhnev, who had promised to help. The TIMES also quoted a government source close to the Supreme Soviet Presidium as telling foreigners that she had subsequently been assigned a district and the paper added that at a 31 May news conference she had hinted to reporters that she would be a candidate after all. Yet when the newly elected deputies were listed on 19 June, she was not included, a fact which gave rise to speculation that she would not be reappointed culture minister when the new government was announced in July.

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However, if such was the intention, the leadership vacillated, perhaps not wanting to aggravate the scandal by removing her in the midst of the publicity over the dacha. Moreover, in an apparent effort to dispel Western speculation, she played a prominent public role during Nixon's late June visit, attending the opera with Nixon, Brezhnev, Podgornyy, Kosygin, Gromyko and Ambassador Dobrynin on 28 June and being present at the 29 June signing of an economic-technical cooperation agreement. Stories of her impending disgrace were further put in doubt by her reappointment as minister at the 26 July Supreme Soviet session.

Her position may have further deteriorated in September, however, when the authorities brutally broke up an unauthorized abstract art show in a Moscow suburban district, an act resulting in such bad publicity abroad that the leadership fired the local district party leader and permitted the restaging of the show.* While there was no public evidence that Furtseva was personally involved in either the original suppression of the 15 September art show or in the subsequent backdown, her ministry must have taken a stand in the dispute over handling the show.

This issue has still not died down, as evidenced by an attack on the second art show in the 23 October issue of the Moscow city paper VECHERNYAYA MOSKVA. The article contended that the show proved the artistic poverty of the painters and justified the contention of Moscow officials at the 28 September press conference that the whole affair was being exaggerated.

Furtseva's past reported attempt at suicide had occurred during her biggest political setback, when she lost her position in the top leadership in late 1961. At the close of the 22d CPSU Congress, when she was dropped from the Central Committee Presidium, she disappeared for several weeks amidst rumors of bitter clashes, serious illness and attempted suicide. Since that drastic fall, she has managed to retain only the relatively powerless position of culture minister, a post she seemed on the verge of losing when her death occurred.

* See the TRENDS of 23 October 1974, pages 19-21.

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NOTES

PRC-INDIA: Peking has not yet explicitly acknowledged Secretary Kissinger's 27-30 October visit to New Delhi, but it offered an unusually harsh indictment of Indian expansionist policies and Soviet support for New Delhi in a lengthy NCNA commentary issued on the very day Kissinger arrived in India. The commentary warned against Indian designs, "emboldened by Soviet social imperialist backing," for military, political and economic dominance in South Asia and denounced a series of recent Indian moves against every one of its neighbors except Burma and Ceylon. Calling special attention to New Delhi's expanded military budget and nuclear development program, the commentary asserted that India sought to use its new power to intimidate and gradually bring its smaller neighbors under direct New Delhi control. Pointing to the behind-the-scenes role played by the USSR, it warned that Moscow has its own motives for supporting Indian expansion, claiming that it desires to enhance Soviet leverage in South Asia at the expense of "the other superpower."

PRC-USSR-MIDEAST: Peking has responded for the first time to the "change" in Soviet Middle East policy concerning the Palestinian question with a lengthy 27 October NCNA commentary. NCNA's argument that the Soviet "shift" was prompted by the recent change in the superpower balance of forces in the Middle East was pegged to an 11 October speech in Kishinev in which Brezhnev had expressed support for a Palestinian national home as well as for Palestinian participation at the Geneva peace conference. NCNA pointedly noted that previously Moscow had criticized the Palestinian liberation struggle and had even treated their plight as a "refugee issue." Pointing to Secretary Kissinger's successful diplomatic efforts in the Middle East since early this year, NCNA asserted that the United States "has gone over to the offensive" while "the Soviet revisionists have been forced on the defensive and their influence has decreased." Peking claimed that Brezhnev's recent endorsement merely signals a new Soviet effort "to stage a comeback in the Middle East" by exploiting enhanced support for the Palestinians and especially for the latter's participation at the Geneva talks "as a counter in their bargaining with U.S. imperialism." Peking has thus far totally ignored the 14-18 October Moscow visit by Egyptian Foreign Minister Fahmi during which the endorsement of a Palestinian national home was reiterated. Peking has similarly remained silent on Brezhnev's planned January visit to Egypt.

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MOSCOW, PEKING ON U.S.-JAPAN TIES: Contrasting Moscow and Peking exploitation of the current controversy in Japan over the presence of U.S. nuclear weapons reflects their varying approaches to the question of U.S.-Japan security ties and the U.S. military presence in Japan. While Peking reported developments briefly and selectively with its usual circumspection toward the United States, Moscow not only reported the controversy but also originated comment pointing up the alleged dangers of Japan's security ties with the United States. A 9 October signed IZVESTIYA article, for example, argued that Japanese observers were questioning the reliability of Washington's promise of prior consultations before bringing nuclear weapons into Japan. The article also asserted that the "so-called Japanese-American security treaty" was now under serious review in Japan. While Moscow media have portrayed the United States as the main villain in the current controversy, a 22 October PRAVDA article chided Japanese Government representatives for attempting to "protect the Pentagon" and "whitewash" U.S.-Japanese military cooperation. In contrast to Moscow, Peking's treatment has been very low key, limited thus far to a pair of NCNA pickups of Japanese news agency reports. A 22 October replay of a TOHO news agency report on the 21 October Anti-war Day demonstrations in Japan did, however, include a rare call for abrogation of the U.S.-Japan mutual security treaty, a theme not seen in PRC media since last April. NCNA reportage on rally speeches excluded denunciations of President Ford's planned November visit to Japan; in fact, monitored Chinese media have not yet been heard to acknowledge the announced visit.

CHINESE EDUCATION: Shanghai, a model province whose example is often followed throughout China, appears engaged in a drive to improve the level of instruction in local primary and secondary schools. Shanghai's WEN HUI PAO on 23 October frontpaged a letter from local teachers and students entitled "Let Students Learn More Skills in School" which came down unusually hard on the "expert" side of the "red and expert" formulation. The letter complained frankly that recent middle school graduates "still show weaknesses in certain fields." Placing responsibility for the poor quality of vocational education on the shoulders of local educational authorities, a separate WEN HUI PAO editor's note asked "our comrades on the educational front" why students could not "learn more skills in school." Shanghai's efforts to improve the quality of education had been reflected in an 8 October Shanghai broadcast which hinted that some college applicants may now be admitted primarily on the basis of their academic considerations. The report noted that special

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attention was paid to enrolling "some of those who had truly performed well," and it revealed that Shanghai enrollment officials were careful to "insure the quality of the admitted students." Shanghai's lead in raising educational standards apparently has been followed in Kiangsu. A 20 October Nanking broadcast on local student enrollment work also noted that special attention was paid to enrolling those applicants who "had truly performed well."

CHINESE RETAIL OUTLETS: Peking's current push to increase light industrial output significantly in the fourth quarter of 1974 appears linked to an innovative Anhwei campaign to expand urban markets by setting up a series of "marketing agent stores" supplementing the network of state commercial centers. Judging by a 26 October ANHWEI DAILY editorial, a number of safeguards govern the new--and apparently controversial--retail organs in order to prevent any resurgence of small-scale capitalism. Existing state stores provide all operating funds and commodities for the new outlets and will set all prices. Accumulated funds must be turned over to state commerce departments, and all business activities of the new stores are to be developed according to party and state economic plans. Nevertheless, the very existence of such stores, providing a buffer between the shopper and the state, represents a step back from the purer forms of communism. The editorial frankly admitted that the new stores were being set up over the objections of some "dubious" commercial leaders who feared that the new outlets would prove "difficult to control or manage." Control responsibilities for the retail outlets rest with local party leaders, who were instructed to take the necessary steps to support the growth of this "new thing."

ALBANIAN DEFENSE MINISTER: Premier Shehu announced on 29 October that he would assume the position of defense minister, thus confirming rumors that Beqir Balluku, minister since 1953, had been ousted. Shehu's announcement came in a speech to the People's Assembly in which he also named a new deputy premier (a post which Balluku had held concurrently) as well as new finance and communications ministers. Judging from a lengthy summary of the speech broadcast by Tirana radio, Shehu did not mention Balluku, whose activities had not been reported since last June. However, Shehu's remark that "the government will take all necessary measures to insure that our army will always remain ideologically pure, loyal to the party line . . .," seemed to give substance to speculation that Balluku was being dismissed for advocating a less hostile position toward Moscow. The premier's speech reiterated the main lines of Hoxha's remarks on foreign

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policy earlier this month: continued intransigence toward the Soviet Union and its East European allies, and a warming of attitude toward Albania's Balkan neighbors. Shehu urged a "normal development of state relations" with Belgrade and also called for the "further development" of existing relations with Romania.

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SUPPLEMENTARY ARTICLE

NEW FIRST DEPUTY EDITOR STRENGTHENS HARDLINE TREND AT PRAVDA

The appointment of hardliner R.I. Kosolapov as PRAVDA's new first deputy chief editor gives the CPSU organ its most conservative leadership since the 1950's. Kosolapov, formerly Agitprop deputy head, replaced V.G. Afanasyev, who simultaneously was named new chief editor of KOMMUNIST. The two appointments--announced in the October issue of the journal ZHURNALIST, signed to press 17 September--suggest a trade-off, the promotion of the anti-intellectual hardliner Kosolapov, balanced by that of the more moderate Afanasyev. Whether or not such a trade-off was actually made, the Kosolapov appointment clearly strengthens the reactionary wing, since he becomes chief PRAVDA spokesman for theory and ideology at a time when the conservative Zimyanin is chief editor.

Kosolapov was last publicly identified as deputy head of Agitprop in the 16 July MOSKOVSKAYA PRAVDA. Afanasyev was listed as KOMMUNIST chief editor in its issue signed to press 5 September but not in the previous issue signed to press 13 August. Other ideological decisions--such as the adoption of the Central Committee decree on Belorussian ideological work--also appear to have occurred in this same period.*

BACKGROUND ON KOSOLAPOV Kosolapov, a 44-year old philosopher, has been identified as a lecturer or consultant in the Central Committee's propaganda section since the mid-1960's, but he was promoted to deputy head of the section only relatively recently, first being identified in this post in the 2 February 1974 PRAVDA. His articles in the 25 May 1968 PRAVDA and May 1971 QUESTIONS OF PHILOSOPHY--attacking the idea of regarding intellectuals as some sort of "elite" or "technocratic" class and insisting on their subordination to the proletariat--identify him as one of the more conservative figures in the ideological field, an impression reinforced by his 1974 articles on international affairs and detente. In a long 21 January 1974 PRAVDA article he stressed that peaceful coexistence "in no way means an end to the class struggle between socialism and capitalism in all its forms" but simply the "rejection of direct military confrontation and use of force and threats of force," a result which the West had been forced to accept by the strengthening

* See the TRENDS of 9 October 1974, pages 24-28.

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of world socialism. In a May 1974 QUESTIONS OF PHILOSOPHY article Kosolapov tackled the problem of squaring peaceful coexistence and cooperation with capitalist governments with the need to aid revolutionary forces in overthrowing these governments. He stressed the "sharp, implacably hostile" ideological war and the dangers of "ideological penetration" and warned against "slipping into positions of right opportunism and unprincipled compromises with class enemies." He condemned a long list of errors, including "pseudorevolutionary adventurism, preaching export of revolution, inciting useless conflicts which can bring only losses, and playing with fire." In his new job at PRAVDA he will take over Afanasyev's role as enunciator of theory and presumably will supervise PRAVDA's department for propaganda of Marxist-Leninist theory.

PRAVDA TREND TOWARDS
CONSERVATIVISM

Kosolapov's appointment clearly strengthens the conservative faction in PRAVDA and highlights how far PRAVDA has regressed in the last ten years from its liberal orientation under chief editor A.M. Rumyantsev and deputy chief editor N.N. Inozemtsev in 1965. Most of the liberal influence that developed under Khrushchev and in the immediate aftermath of Khrushchev's fall was eliminated during the late 1965-66 purge of PRAVDA. Liberal chief editor Rumyantsev was removed in September 1965, followed by responsible secretary S.B. Sutotskiy around the turn of the year, and liberal deputy chief editor Inozemtsev in May 1966. Rumyantsev became academic secretary of the Academy of Sciences' economics division, Sutotskiy went on pension, and Inozemtsev became director of the Institute of World Economics and International Relations.

During this period most of the top posts at PRAVDA were taken over by persons brought in from the outside. Conservative Deputy Foreign Minister M.V. Zimyanin became chief editor; SOVIET RUSSIA chief editor K.I. Zarodov became first deputy chief editor; RSFSR Publishing Committee Chairman B.I. Stukalin became deputy chief editor; KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA chief editor Yu. P. Voronov became responsible secretary of the editorial board; SOVIET RUSSIA responsible secretary S.V. Tsukasov became first deputy responsible secretary; deputy head of the Central Committee's culture section G.I. Kunitsyn became editor of the literature and art department; and the head of the party life department of the journal PROBLEMS OF PEACE AND SOCIALISM, S.M. Kovalev, became editor for the department for propaganda of Marxist-Leninist theory.

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Kunitsyn's late 1966 appointment was especially revealing, since he had joined in the attacks on Romyantsev at the time of the latter's ouster in late 1965. Kunitsyn, author of a book on "party spirit" in literature, in a November 1965 KOMMUNIST article had attacked the liberal interpretation of Lenin's attitude toward art propounded by NOVY MIR and Romyantsev and reasserted the right to expel writers from the writers union for ideological deviations.* With Kunitsyn's arrival at PRAVDA, literature and art editor N.A. Abalkin was demoted to an observer in that department, and Romyantsev's line on culture was reversed. As new literature and art editor, Kunitsyn helped prepare the 1968 ideological crackdown. This was done in a 16 February 1968 LITERARY RUSSIA article which argued that Lenin was willing to tolerate artistically deficient literature as long as it was politically useful, and a 29 February 1968 PRAVDA article which attacked the "legend" that Lenin had been tolerant toward hostile trends in art--a view promoted by Romyantsev in his 9 September 1965 PRAVDA article.

New theory editor Kovalev also played a key role in this conservative trend, authoring a notorious 26 September 1968 PRAVDA article introducing the "Brezhnev doctrine" of the right to intervene in other socialist countries. By no means all of the 1965-1966 additions were as conservative as Zimyanin, Kunitsyn and Kovalev, however. Voronov, for example, had bravely--even recklessly--crusaded against Lysenko both before such attacks were officially sanctioned and after they had ceased elsewhere, and his transfer from KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA was presumably intended to end the unwanted criticisms in this regard.

Moreover, some out-and-out liberals remained among the survivors at PRAVDA. Political observer F.M. Burlatskiy and collegium member L.V. Karpinskiy, clearly rank in this category. They created a furor by publishing an article in the 30 June 1967 KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA attacking censorship. KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA was forced to run an editorial on 8 July attacking the article as a "gross ideological error," and Burlatskiy and Karpinskiy left PRAVDA's staff. Earlier, Burlatskiy had apparently stepped out of line by interpreting Kosygin's remarks at a London press conference on 9 February 1967, as implying a more favorable Soviet attitude toward the idea of limiting ABM's than the facts apparently warranted. Reports leaked to Western newsmen after the event indicated the article was in error.

* See the FBIS SURVEY of 14 March 1968, pages 22-23.

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Another shakeup hit PRAVDA in the late summer and fall of 1968, in connection with the Czech events and the ideological turmoil of that year. First deputy editor Zarodov was packed off to Prague as chief editor of PROBLEMS OF PEACE AND SOCIALISM about the time of the invasion and Voronov was replaced as responsible secretary. Deputy chief editor Stukalin was promoted to first deputy chief editor, Afanasyev came from the Academy of Social Sciences to become deputy chief editor for questions of theory, PRAVDA's editor for the socialist countries department A.I. Lukovets advanced to deputy chief editor, and first deputy responsible secretary Tsukasov moved up to responsible secretary.

Kunitsyn left PRAVDA in early 1969 and Kovalev in late 1971, but other conservatives have come to PRAVDA, including such radical types as anti-Semitic propagandist V.V. Bolshakov, who became deputy responsible secretary in charge of PRAVDA's international departments in 1970. Bolshakov wrote articles going beyond official anti-Israeli policy and even implicitly criticizing official positions as too soft on Israel and the Jews.* His personal crusade against the Jews appears to have ended only recently. The September 1974 ZHURNALIST announced that Bolshakov had been transferred abroad as a PRAVDA correspondent, stationed in far off Australia, New Zealand and Oceania.

* See the TRENDS of 31 October 1973, pages 30-31.

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A P P E N D I X

MOSCOW, PEKING BROADCAST STATISTICS 21 - 27 OCTOBER 1974

<u>Moscow (2660 items)</u>			<u>Peking (935 items)</u>		
Pakistani Prime Minister	(--)	6%	Danish Prime Minister	(8%)	9%*
Bhutto in USSR			Hartling in PRC		
China	(5%)	5%	[Maritime Transport	(--)	3%]
Arab Summit Conference,	(--)	4%	Agreement		
Rabat			Indochina	(8%)	9%
[Soviet Leaders'	(--)	3%]	[Vietnam	(5%)	4%]
Greetings			[PRC-Lao Communi-	(--)	3%]
Kissinger in USSR	(--)	4%	cations Agreement		
1973 World Peace Congress	(--)	3%	Criticism of Lin Piao	(10%)	8%
Anniversary			and Confucius		
European CP Meeting,	(3%)	2%	Economic Crisis in the	(1%)	6%
Warsaw			West		
FRG Chancellor Schmidt	(--)	2%	UNGA Session	(7%)	6%
in USSR			24th Anniversary of	(--)	3%
			Chinese "Volunteers"		
			Entry into Korean War		

These statistics are based on the voicecast commentary output of the Moscow and Peking domestic and international radio services. The term "commentary" is used to denote the lengthy item—radio talk, speech, press article or editorial, government or party statement, or diplomatic note. Items of extensive reportage are counted as commentaries.

Figures in parentheses indicate volume of comment during the preceding week.

Topics and events given major attention in terms of volume are not always discussed in the body of the Trends. Some may have been covered in prior issues; in other cases the propaganda content may be routine or of minor significance.

* This figure excludes brief reports on Mao Tse-tung's meeting with Hartling.